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THE FOX GUARDING THE HENHOUSE: NEWMAN V.
KING COUNTYAND WASIINGTON'S FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION LAW
Julia E. Markley
Abstract: In its 1997 decision Newman v. King County, the Supreme Court of Washington
created a categorical exemption for open police files under the Public Disclosure Act (PDA).
The court reasoned that if a police file was open, its confidentiality was necessarily "essential
for effective law enforcement," and thus came within an exemption from disclosure. As a
result of the court's decision, law enforcement agencies need only assert that an investigation
is active in order for the public record to be exempt. This Note argues that the majority's
broad and abstract opinion is contrary to the law and facts of Newman. Rather, the dissent
correctly applied the Act's plain language requiring a court to analyze whether an individual
record actually comes within an exemption.
Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according
to conscience, above all liberties.'
John Milton
Our nation's civil rights movement exploded in the 1960s. The
Montgomery bus boycott, lunch counter sit-ins, police firehose brutality,
and stirring speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. were images every
American watched on the nightly news. Today, history books document
the great civil rights leaders slain: Dr. King, Malcolm X, and Medgar
Evers. National Black leaders were not the only targets; Edwin T. Pratt, a
Black civil rights leader in Seattle, Washington was killed on January 26,
1969 while standing in the doorway of his West Seattle home.2 Neither
local police nor the FBI ever found Pratt's assailant.3
Twenty-five years later, in March 1994, a freelance journalist
requested that the King County Department of Public Safety provide him
access to the Edwin Pratt murder file pursuant to the Washington Public
Disclosure Act (PDA).4 The PDA requires public agencies to make
available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the
1. John Milton, Areopagitica, in Complete Poems and Major Prose 716, 746 (Merritt Y. Hughes
ed., Odyssey Press 1957).
2. Pratt, Urban League Director, Shot, Killed, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 27, 1969, at A.




record falls within a specific exemption of the Act.5 The Department
denied the journalist's request almost entirely; it released only a heavily
redacted initial incident report.' The Department claimed the murder file
fell within the statutory exemption protecting records "essential to
effective law enforcement.,
7
The dissatisfied journalist, David Newman, brought suit seeking a
declaratory judgment entitling him to statutory damages because the
Department had violated the PDA.' Upon Newman's motion for
summary judgment, the trial court ruled that the files were not entitled to
a blanket exemption from disclosure.9 The Supreme Court of
Washington reversed, holding that the PDA categorically exempts from
disclosure all information contained in an open, active police
investigation file."0
This Note argues that Newman's categorical exemption for all open
law enforcement files-with no further analysis of whether the
nondisclosure of the information sought is essential for effective law
enforcement-is contrary to the language of the statute. Newman usurps
both the constitutional protection and the legislative intent behind the
PDA by removing the power of decision from the courts. Instead,
Newman gives Washington's law enforcement agencies unchecked
power to withhold information, thus opening the door for abuse.
Part I of this Note describes the federal Freedom of Information Act's
(FOIA) law enforcement exemption, which informed the Newman
court's analysis. Part II provides an overview of the pertinent part of the
Washington Public Disclosure Act (PDA) and discusses the salient cases
interpreting the PDA and its law enforcement exemption. Part III
outlines the majority and dissenting opinions in Newman. Part IV argues
5. The Washington statute provides, in pertinent part: "Each agency, in accordance with published
rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record
falls within the specific exemptions of [this Act] ... or other statute...." Wash. Rev. Code
§ 42.17.260(1) (1998).
6. Newman, 133 Wash. 2d at 568. 947 P.2d at 713. After further review, the Department decided
to release more information to Newman because it determined that such release might prompt leads
helpful to investigation of the case. The incident report was re-released with much less information
redacted. Id., 947 P.2d at 713-14.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at569,947 P.2d at 714.
10. Id. at 567-68, 947 P.2d at 714. The supreme court granted the Department's request for
discretionary review. Id. at 570, 947 P.2d at 714.
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that the categorical exemption resulting from Newman is inconsistent
with the PDA's requirement that courts analyze whether nondisclosure is
"essential to effective law enforcement." Part IV notes that federal courts
conduct a more reasoned approach in deciding whether a document is
exempt. Finally, Part V suggests that Washington adopt a case-by-case
approach to future law enforcement exemption cases and employ a multi-
factored test to determine whether nondisclosure is indeed "essential to
effective law enforcement."
I. THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
Washington courts have looked to federal law for guidance when
interpreting the PDA. Newman was no exception, drawing upon the
federal courts' analysis of the FOIA's law enforcement exemption
(Exemption 7A)." Like the PDA, the FOIA mandates liberal disclosure. 2
Under federal law, records are exempt if "the production of such law
enforcement records or information could reasonably be expected to
interfere with enforcement proceedings."' 3 The federal government has
the burden of demonstrating that the exemption applies. 4 Circuit courts
have uniformly interpreted the FOIA to require a two-pronged analysis:
(1),whether there is a pending or prospective investigation, and
(2) whether disclosure will cause articulable harm. 5
To satisfy the requirement of a pending or prospective investigation,
there must be "at least a reasonable chance that an enforcement
proceeding will occur."' 6 In determining whether disclosure will cause
11. Id. at 572-73, 947 P.2d at 715-16.
12. See infra Part IV.D.1.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1994).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1994).
15. See, e.g., Manna v. Department of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1164 (3d Cir. 1995); see also NLRB
v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 232 (1978) (looking at legislative history in applying
Exemption 7(A) whenever concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding would be harmed by
premature release of evidence).
16. Dickerson v. Department of Justice, 992 F.2d 1426, 1430 (6th Cir. 1993). In Dickerson, a
newspaper requested the FBI file on Jimmy Hoffa, a union official who had mysteriously
disappeared fourteen years prior to the request. Id. at 1427. Despite public opinion and unofficial
FBI comments that Hoffa was murdered and that the perpetrator would never be found, FBI
affidavits convinced the court that an investigation was ongoing. Id. at 1432. The affidavits
submitted attested to the current resources allocated to the Hoffa case, the increased likelihood of
additional witnesses coming forward with the passage of time, and that FBI criminal investigations
often result in enforcement proceedings many years after the crime occurred. Id.; see also Bevis v.
1109
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articulable harm, the leading U.S. Supreme Court case is NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.17 In that case, the Court concluded that
although a recent amendment to Exemption 7(A) was designed to
eliminate blanket exemptions for records found in investigatory files, 8
generic determinations of likely interferences could still be made. 9 The
generic determination in Robbins Tire, however, was actually quite
narrow: witness statements in pending NLRB proceedings were deemed
likely to interfere with enforcement proceedings, and as such were
exempt until at least after the NLRB hearing.2"
Following Robbins Tire, federal circuit courts have applied a
"category-of-document by category-of-document" approach.2' An
agency must categorize documents into relevant groups that are
"sufficiently distinct to allow a court to grasp how each.., category of
Department of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (requiring "concrete prospective law
enforcement proceeding").
17. 437 U.S. 214. Newman's majority and dissenting opinions cited Robbins Tire for inconsistent
propositions. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
18. An example of a congressionally-disapproved blanket exemption is one covering all
investigatory files even if an enforcement proceeding is neither imminent nor likely. Center for Nat'l
Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
19. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 236.
20. Id. at 242. The Court grounded its holding in legislative history that expressly supported
protecting NLRB witness statements from opposing litigants prior to the NLRB proceedings in order
to prevent unfair discovery. Id. at 224-26.
21. See, e.g., In re Department of Justice, 999 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1993) (dividing Jimmy
Hoffa file into nine unnamed categories); Dickerson, 992 F.2d at 1433-34 (delineating categories
such as "results of high level strategy conferences with synopses of the investigation to date,"
"memoranda updating FBI director on status of investigation," "documents setting forth leads to be
conducted," "documents containing information received from confidential informants,"
"information and documents provided by local law enforcement," "interviews of third parties and
cooperating witnesses," "public source information such as newspaper clippings and press releases,"
"public and sealed court documents," "laboratory results setting forth results of examinations," and
"polygraph worksheets and reports"); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. EEOC, 710 F.2d 136, 142-43 (4th Cir.
1982) (delineating categories such as "correspondence between other governmental agencies and the
Commission concerning the status of litigation involving the Commissioner's charge filed,"
"correspondence between private attorneys and the Commission pertaining to the filing of charges
against the company," "correspondence between the Commission and state or city referral agencies
concerning the filing of charges or referral of cases for Commission processing," correspondence
between labor organizations and the Commission concerning the processing of charges"). In Bevis v.
Department of State, the court only accepted categories that allowed it to assess how the disclosure
would interfere with enforcement proceedings, for example, "the identities of possible witnesses and
informants," "reports on the location and viability of potential evidence," and "polygraph reports."
801 F.2d at 1389-90. Unacceptable to the Bevis court were the categories with unhelpful names:
"teletypes," "airtels," and "letters." Id.
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documents, if disclosed, would interfere with the investigation." '22 A
court is not required to make a specific factual finding showing that each
document would actually interfere with enforcement proceedings; rather,
if a category of documents would generally interfere, it is exempt.23
Sufficient information in sufficient detail must be submitted to enable the
court to make a reasoned, independent assessment of the claimed
exemption." Each category must allow the court to trace a "rational link
between the nature of the document and the alleged likely interference." '2s
Most importantly, federal courts have sought to achieve a "workable
balance" between the public's right to know and the government's need
to keep some information confidential. 6
II. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEMPTION IN THE
WASHINGTON PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ACT
A. The Public Disclosure Act
Underlying the Public Disclosure Act is the premise that public access
to information concerning the workings of the government is a
fundamental precondition to a free society. To achieve the goal of
public confidence in government,28 the PDA keeps the government
accountable by mandating disclosure of campaign finances,29 lobbyist
reporting," and public records.3
22. Bevis, 801 F.2d at 1389 (internal quotations omitted).
23. Department ofJustice, 999 F.2d at 1307.
24. Dickerson, 992 F.2d at 1431; accord Manna v. Department of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1163 (3d
Cir. 1995) (requiring government to submit detailed affidavits indicating why document is exempt).
25. Bevis, 801 F.2d at 1389 (remanding to allow FBI to reclassify requested documents to enable
it to meet its burden).
26. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (analyzing whether requested
documents were "compiled" for law enforcement purposes).
27. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.010(1 1) (1998) provides: "That, mindful of the right of individuals
to privacy and of the desirability of the efficient administration of government, full access to
information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be assured as a fundamental
and necessary precondition to the sound governance of a free society." See Amren v. City of
Kalama, 131 Wash. 2d 25, 31, 929 P.2d 389, 392 (1997) (paraphrasing statutory language).
28. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.010(5) (1998) ("That public confidence in government at all
levels is essential and must be promoted by all possible means.").
29. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 42.17.030-.135 (1998).
30. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 42.17.155-.230 (1998).
31. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 42.17.250-.340 (1998).
1111
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The public records section, which was at issue in Newman, explicitly
lays out the policy underlying that section, and requires that the section
be construed in light of that policy:
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the
agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do
not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for
the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The
people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain
control over the instruments that they have created. The public
records subdivision of this chapter shall be liberally construed and
its exemptions narrowly construed to promote this public policy.32
The instruction to construe the PDA's policy liberally and construe its
exemptions narrowly is stated three times in the Act.33
The heart of the PDA's public records section is found at RCW
42.17.260(1), which mandates that "[e]ach agency...shall make
available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the
record falls within the specific exemptions of... this section or other
statute.34 In Newman, the King County Department of Public Safety
invoked the law enforcement exemption to shield the Pratt file. The
exemption provides that the following are exempt from public inspection
and copying:
[S]pecific intelligence information and specific investigative
records compiled by investigative, law enforcement, and penology
agencies, and state agencies vested with the responsibility to
discipline members of any profession, the nondisclosure of which is
essential to effective law enforcement or for the protection of any
person's right to privacy.35
The Newman case applied this exemption to pending police
investigations.36
In anticipation of controversy regarding interpretation of the
exemption, the PDA provides a comprehensive system for dealing with
disputes regarding the disclosure of information. Courts are granted
32. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.25 1.
33. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 42.17.010(11), .251 & .920 (1998).
34. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.260(1).
35. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.310(1)(d).
36. See infra Part III.
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jurisdiction over controversies," and are instructed to "take into account
the policy of this chapter that free and open examination of public
records is in the public interest, even though such examination may cause
inconvenience or embarrassment."3 The agency bears the burden of
proving that a record falls within any exemption. 9 If requested
information contains both exempt and non-exempt material, the exempt
material (for example, private information) may be redacted, but the
remaining material must be disclosed.40 Each case of deletion, however,
must be fully justified in writing.4 Judicial review of challenged agency
actions is de novo, and a court may examine in camera the records
in question.42
In addition, the PDA's strong policy in favor of disclosure is
demonstrated by the short time period within which agencies must
respond to requests and the strict imposition of statutory fees and
penalties awarded to requesters who were wrongfully denied access.
Agencies have a duty to provide "the fullest assistance to inquirers and
the most timely possible action on requests for information."'43 Attorney
fees are awarded to a party prevailing against an agency in court, and a
court may award a penalty amount between five dollars and one hundred
dollars for each day the party was denied the right to inspect a record."
Even a good faith denial, if later ruled to be wrongful, can merit the
imposition of penalty fees.'
37. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.340(1) (1998).
38. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.340(3) (1998).
39. Upon the motion of any person having been denied an opportunity to inspect or copy a
public record by an agency, the superior court in the county in which a record is maintained may
require the responsible agency to show cause why it has refused to allow inspection or copying
of a specific public record or class of records. The burden of proof shall be on the agency to
establish that refusal to permit public inspection and copying is in accordance with a statute that
exempts or prohibits disclosure in whole or in part of specific information or records.
Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.340(1).
40. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.310(2) (1998); Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash. 2d25, 32, 929
P.2d 389, 393 (1997).
41. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.260(1) (1998) provides that "in each case, the justification for the
deletion shall be explained fully in writing."
42. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.340(3).
43. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.290 (1998); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.320 (1998)
(requiring agency to respond to request within five business days and mandating agency superior to
review requests within two business days of denial).
44. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.340(4) (1998).
45. Amren, 131 Wash. 2d at 36. 929 P.2d at 395.
1113
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The PDA provides broader access to information than the FOIA. First,
unlike the PDA, the FOIA contains no instruction to construe its
provisions broadly and its exemptions narrowly.46 Second, the PDA
allows the successful litigant costs and attorneys' fees, whereas the FOIA
has no such provision.47 Third, the language of the exemptions is
different. The FOIA exempts information if disclosure would
"reasonably interfere with enforcement proceedings,"48 whereas the
PDA exempts information if nondisclosure is "essential to effective law
enforcement."49 The implications of these nuances will significantly
impact the outcome of a case."
B. Washington Case Law Under the Public Disclosure Act
Washington cases concerning the public records section of the PDA
have sought to achieve the balance between public access to records and
the government's interest in confidentiality that the statute envisioned."
Courts deciding PDA cases have explicitly reserved for the court the
power of review, stating that "the most direct course to [the PDA's]
devitalization" is through agency self-policing. 2 The PDA's strong
policy in favor of disclosure resulted in some form of disclosure in
almost all of the court's pre-Newman decisions. 3 In many of those cases,
46. Newman v. King County, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 581, 947 P.2d 713, 710 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting).
47. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.340(3); see also Michael C. McClintock et al., Washington's New
Public Records Disclosure Act: Freedom of Information in Municipal Labor Law, 11 Gonz. L. Rev.
13, 17 n.I 1 (suggesting Washington is attempting to be more pro-disclosure than federal government
by enacting costs provision).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1994) (emphasis added).
49. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.310(1)(d) (emphasis added).
50. See infra Part IV.
51. See, e.g., Spokane Police Guild v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 112 Wash. 2d 30,
33-34, 769 P.2d 283, 284 (1989) (noting that PDA provides "a workable formula which
encompasses, balances and appropriately protects all interests, while placing emphasis on
responsible disclosure").
52. Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash. 2d 25,34 n.6, 929 P.2d 389, 394 n.6 (1997); Progressive
Animal Welfare Soc'y v. University of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 270 n.17, 884 P.2d 592, 607 n.17
(1994) [PAWS]; Brouillet v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 114 Wash. 2d 788, 794, 791 P.2d 526, 530 (1990);
Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 131,580 P.2d 246,251 (1978), quoted in Newman v. King
County, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 580, 947 P.2d 713, 719 (1997) (Alexander, J., dissenting).
53. See Lindberg v. Lindberg, 133 Wash. 2d 729, 733, 948 P.2d 805, 814 (1997) (disclosing
copyrighted site and drainage engineering drawings); Amren, 131 Wash. 2d at 28, 929 P.2d at 391
(disclosing report on complaints against police chief); PAWS, 125 Wash. 2d at 254-55, 884 P.2d at
599 (disclosing University's unfunded grant proposal subject to redaction for statutory exemption for
1114
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courts also allowed an agency to withhold validly exempt information. 4
Cases involving the law enforcement exemption are few,55 so cases
speaking to other PDA exemptions provide further guidance. On the
whole, PDA exemption cases place a heavy burden on the agency to
argue exemption and order the agency to excise only the exempt material
and to disclose the rest.
1. Case Law Prior to Newman Places a Heavy Burden on Agencies to
Prove Records Are Exempt from Disclosure
Two important points are manifest in jurisprudence prior to the
Newman decision. First, in light of the Act's strong mandate for broad
disclosure, courts have required agencies to present specific and cogent
evidence to meet their burden of proving that a record is exempt. Courts
looked to the purpose of the exemption to see if a record actually fell
within the claimed exemption. Second, upon this inquiry, courts have not
automatically exempted the entire record if they found some information
statutorily exempt. Instead, courts have required agencies to parse the
exempt information and disclose the remainder of the record.
a. The Purpose of the Claimed Exemption
Instead of merely applying the language of a claimed exemption,
courts have required agencies to prove that nondisclosure would actually
reflect the purpose of the exemption. 6 This kind of analysis can operate
"valuable formulae"); Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wash. 2d 782, 786-87, 845 P.2d 995, 998-99 (1993)
(remanding to determine whether prosecutor's file on adverse expert witness is partially exempt
under work product exemption); Brouillet, 114 Wash. 2d at 790, 791 P.2d at 526-27 (disclosing
teacher certification revocations-some containing statements about sexual involvement of teachers
and students-subject to redaction of child victims' names); Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wash. 2d at
3 1, 769 P.2d at 283 (disclosing liquor board's entire investigative report containing names of police
officers involved in illicit party); Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 126, 580 P.2d at 248 (disclosing tax
assessor's real property appraisal notes); Tacoma Pub. Library v. Woessner, 90 Wash. App. 205,
222-23, 951 P.2d 357, 365-66 (1998) (disclosing public library employee's names, salaries, fringe
benefits, and vacation and sick leave pay). But see Cowles Publ'g Co. v. State Patrol, 109 Wash. 2d
712, 733, 748 P.2d 597, 608 (1988) (prohibiting disclosure of police internal investigation report).
54. See, e.g., PAWS, 125 Wash. 2d at 255, 884 P.2d at 599; Dawson, 120 Wash. 2d at 795, 845
P.2d at 1003; Brouillet, 114 Wash. 2d at 797, 791 P.2d at 532; Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 127, 580 P.2d
at 249; Woessner, 90 Wash. App. at 212, 951 P.2d at 365-66.
55. See, e.g., Newman, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 947 P.2d 712; Cowles, 109 Wash. 2d 712, 748 P.2d
597.
56. PAWS, 125 Wash. 2d at 255-58, 884 P.2d at 599-600 (refusing to exempt categorically
scientific grant proposal under deliberative process exemption); Brouillet, 114 Wash. 2d at 799, 791
1115
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as a "severe limit[]" on the scope of an exemption. 7 In Hearst Corp. v.
Hoppe, the King County assessor denied a request for property tax forms
in connection with a newspaper's investigation of whether the County
Assessor gave special favors to his campaign contributors. 8 To properly
claim exemption from disclosure, the assessor had to show how
nondisclosure came within the purpose of the deliberative process
exemption. Specifically, the agency had to establish that the documents
contained discussion and were part of a policymaking process, and
affirmatively show that disclosure would be injurious to the agency's
deliberative function.59 Because the documents contained essentially
factual data and not opinions or observations, the King County assessor
failed to meet its burden and disclosure was required.6
b. Agencies Must Specify Reasons Why a Particular Record Is Exempt
General reasons for exemption are insufficient to sustain a denial of
access; an agency must convincingly point to specific statutory-based
reasons to withhold disclosure.6' In Spokane Police Guild v. Washington
State Liquor Control Board, the issue was whether disclosure of
partygoers' names in Liquor Board documents that pertained to a party
held in violation of liquor law would violate privacy rights.62 The court
was not swayed by arguments about the potential embarrassment
resulting from disclosure of a party attendee's name, and cited the PDA
proposition that free and open examination of public records is in the
public interest, even though such examination may cause "inconvenience
or embarrassment."63 The court also dismissed arguments that the names
P.2d at 532 (holding that information regarding revocation of teachers' certificates does not fall
within intra-agency memorandum exemption because requested information is not part of
policymaking process); Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 133, 580 P.2d at 252 (stating that "purpose of
exemption severely limits its scope").
57. PAWS, 125 Wash. 2d at 245, 884 P.2d at 599 (quoting Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 133, 580 P.2d
at 252).
58. 90 Wash. 2d at 134, 580 P.2d at 252.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Brouillet v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 114 Wash. 2d 788, 800, 791 P.2d 526, 533 (1990)
("The language of the statute does not authorize us to imply exemptions but only allows specific
exemptions to stand.").
62. 112 Wash. 2d 30,38-40, 769 P.2d 283,286-88 (1989).
63. Id. at 38, 769 P.2d at 287 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.340(3)). The privacy interest is
only violated if disclosure would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" and the information
"is not of legitimate concern to the public." Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.255 (1998). The Spokane court
1116
Vol. 73:1107, 1998
Freedom of Information Law
of attendees should not be disclosed because the Liquor Board had
promised the attendees confidentiality in exchange for their statements.'
A case where the Supreme Court of Washington held nondisclosure is
wananted aptly illustrates the quantum of proof necessary for such a
holding. In Cowles Publishing Co. v. State the law enforcement
exemption was invoked." The court in Cowles ruled that the names of
law enforcement officers against whom complaints had been sustained
after internal investigations need not be disclosed." The agencies
redacted the names relying on RCW 42.17.310(1)(d), the law enforce-
ment and privacy exemption, on the grounds that the deletions were
necessary (1) to protect privacy rights of persons named in the
documents, (2) to insure effective internal affairs investigations, and
(3) to insure confidentiality in the complaint reporting system.67
The Cowles court demanded ample proof before holding the
information exempt from disclosure under the law enforcement
exemption. The court noted that when a complaint is made against an
officer, the officer charged is required to testify before his internal affairs
division with the understanding that his testimony cannot be used in a
criminal investigation.68 Furthermore, fellow officers who testify are
promised confidentiality.69 Because internal investigation departments
depend on voluntary cooperation, disclosure of names would seriously
inhibit people from coming forward.7" The law enforcement agencies
ruled that a party with forty guests does not concern intimate details of one's personal and private
life to implicate the right to privacy. Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wash. 2d at 38, 769 P.2d at 286.
64. Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wash. 2d. at 40, 769 P.2d at 288 (stating that "promises cannot
override the requirements of the disclosure law") (citation omitted). A number of attendees were off-
duty police officers who were required by the city police chief to cooperate with the Liquor Board's
investigation. Id. at 39, 769 P.2d at 287. The court distinguished this case from Cowles Publishing
Co. v. State Patrol, 109 Wash. 2d 712, 748 P.2d 597 (1988), which disallowed the disclosure of
names of police officers about whom complaints had been filed because their confidentiality is
essential to effective law enforcement. Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wash. 2d at 37, 769 P.2d at 286.
The Spokane court reasoned that only police internal investigations fall under the Cowles rule and
that Spokane technically involved a Liquor Board, not a police, investigation. Id. at 39, 769 P.2d
at 287.
65. 109 Wash. 2d 712, 748 P.2d 597.
66. Id. at 713, 748 P.2d at 598.
67. Id. at 714, 748 P.2d at 598.
68. Id. at 715, 748 P.2d at 599 ("The officer does not have the right to interrogate other witnesses,
is not entitled to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, and is subject to dismissal upon
refusal to respond.") (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 717, 748 P.2d at 600.
70. Id. at 717-18, 748 P.2d at 600.
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persuaded the court that their internal system for responding to
complaints of officer misconduct was a workable and effective procedure
for ensuring that officers do not abuse their authority or engage in
unlawful activities."
2. Case Law Prior to Newman Emphasized Excising Exempt Material
and Disclosing the Rest
If a requested record contains validly exempt information, agencies
may not simply deny access to the entire record. Rather, an agency must
excise exempt information and disclose the remainder. This parse and
disclose requirement is statutorily grounded72 and is consistent with the
PDA's instruction to construe its substance broadly and construe its
exemptions narrowly.73
Although very little information may be left after heavy redaction, the
court still has required disclosure of any non-exempt information. In one
case, Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. University of Washington
(PAWS), the Supreme Court of Washington held that although "much of
the material at issue is covered by [the valuable formulae]
exemption.... [T]hose portions which do not come within the
exemption and which are not covered by any other exemption or other
statute must be disclosed."'74 The PAWS case concerned the disclosure of
a scientific grant proposal.75 The court rejected University arguments that
disclosure of any part of the grant might facilitate intellectual piracy and
result in a loss of patent rights.76
Similarly, courts have required selective redaction and disclosure in
cases involving multiple exemptions. For example, in Dawson v. Daly,
the court considered whether a prosecutor's file on an adverse expert
witness was exempt from disclosure under, inter alia, the discovery/work
71. Id. at 729, 748 P.2d at 606.
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
74. 125 Wash. 2d 243, 255, 884 P.2d 592, 599 (1995) [PAWS]; see also Brouillet v. Cowles
Publ'g Co., 114 Wash. 2d 788, 790, 791 P.2d 526, 527 (1990) (ordering disclosure of records
containing reasons for teacher certification revocations, subject to redaction of sexual misconduct
victims' names and identifying details).
75. See PAWS, 125 Wash. 2d at 247, 884 P.2d at 595.
76. Russell K. Yoshinaka, Note, Too Much of a Good Thing? Public Access to Medical Research
in Washington After PAWS v. U.W., 70 Wash. L. Rev. 929,946-47 (1995) (citing amicus brief).
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product exemption." The court remanded with instructions for an in
camera determination of whether the documents fell under Washington's
definition of work product. After separating the work product
documents, the trial court was to examine whether any of the remaining
documents were exempt under other PDA provisions, considering each
potentially applicable exemption in ta .78 Dawson and PAWS
demonstrate the statutory and common law parse and disclose
requirement.79
III. NEWMAN v. KJNG COUNTY: THE MAJORITY AND
THE DISSENT
A. The Newman Majority
The Supreme Court of Washington's decision in Newman v. King
County is at odds with prior jurisprudence. The Newman court held that a
requested murder file was exempt from disclosure in its entirety under
the PDA's exemption for documents "essential to effective law
enforcement."8 The five-four majority" opinion reasoned that because
the murder was unsolved and the police considered the file "open," the
confidentiality of the file was essential to effective law enforcement. 2
The language in the majority opinion was not limited to unsolved murder
files, but to all open files: "We hold RCW 42.17.310(1)(d) provides a
77. 120 Wash. 2d 782, 788, 845 P.2d 995, 1000 (1993). A deputy prosecutor (Paul Stem) and a
child protection specialist created files on an expert who frequently appears as a defense expert
witness in child sex abuse prosecutions. The files contained articles and books by the witness,
correspondence with third parties about the witness, and strategies and questions for cross-
examination. The prosecutor's office compiled the file for impeachment purposes. ld. at 787, 845
P.2d at 998-99.
78. See id. at 788, 845 P.2d at 1000.
79. Recently, in Limstrom v. Ladenburg, the Supreme Court of Washington refused to exempt
categorically from disclosure prosecutors' litigation files under the work product exemption. 963
P.2d 869, 872 (,Wash. 1998) (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.310(1)0)). Instead, the court required
the prosecutor to identify and excise only those documents that were work product and to disclose
the rest of the file. Id. at 878.
80. Newman v. King County, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 575, 947 P.2d 712, 716 (1997) (quoting Wash.
Rev. Code § 42.17.3 10(l)(d)).
81. Justice Johnson wrote the majority opinion, which Justices Dolliver, Smith, Guy and
Talmadge joined. Justice Alexander wrote a dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Durham and
Justices Madsen and Sanders joined.
82. Newman, 133 Wash. 2d at 575, 947 P.2d at 716.
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broad categorical exemption from disclosure all information contained in
an open active police investigation file .... ,83
Because the issue in Newman was a matter of first impression in
Washington, the majority drew upon federal case law interpreting FOIA
for guidance.84 It noted the U.S. Supreme Court statement that it is
feasible to make a "generic determination" about what is essential for
effective law enforcement." Newman applied a Sixth Circuit test to
determine whether an investigation is leading toward an enforcement
proceeding. The test considers the following: "(1) affidavits by people
with direct knowledge of and responsibility for the investigation...,
(2) whether resources are allocated to the investigation, and (3) whether
enforcement proceedings are contemplated."86
Applying this test to the facts in Newman, the majority found it
evident that disclosure was not required:
The County has shown they and the FBI have personnel assigned to
the case. Evidence was presented by individuals responsible for the
investigation who stated the case was still open and enforcement
proceedings were contemplated. The evidence also establishes the
documents requested cannot be disclosed because their release
would impair the ability of law enforcement to share information
and would inhibit the ability of police officers to determine, in their
professional judgment, how and when information will be
released.87
Police affidavits attesting that the Pratt file was open and the
investigation was ongoing persuaded the majority that the file should be
exempt from disclosure.
The majority noted that on previous occasions the court had stated that
the PDA does not allow withholding entire records and that agencies
must parse and disclose.88 The majority declined to apply this proposition
to the facts of the case at bar:
83. Id. at 575, 947 P.2d at 717.
84. Id. at 572-73, 947 P.2d at 715-16.
85. Id. at 573, 947 P.2d at 716 (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,
223-24 (1978)); see also supra Part I.
86. Newman, 133 Wash. 2d at 573, 947 P.2d at 716 (quoting Dickerson v. Department of Justice,
992 F.2d 1426, 1431-32 (6th Cir. 1993)).
87. Id. at 574, 947 P.2d at 716.
88. Id. (quoting Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. University of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243,
261, 884 P.2d 592, 602 (1993)).
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The statute does not define or establish any guidelines to limit the
scope of exemption.... The ongoing nature of the investigation
naturally provides no basis to decide what is important. Requiring a
law enforcement agency to segregate documents before a case is
solved could result in the disclosure of sensitive information. The
determination of sensitive or non-sensitive documents often cannot
be made until the case has been solved. This exemption allows the
law enforcement agency, not the courts, to determine what
information, if any, is essential to solve a case.89
The Newman court was convinced that it is difficult to determine the
importance of a document in an ever-changing investigation.
B. The Newman Dissent
The four dissenting justices in Newman would have affirmed the trial
court's determination that a police file's open status does not trigger a
categorical exemption, and that an in camera review is appropriate to
determine whether any material is "essential to effective law
enforcement."9 The dissent criticized the majority's decision as
(1) contravening the plain language of the PDA, (2) contradicting prior
cases holding that the PDA does not authorize withholding of records in
their entirety, (3) resting on federal authority that does not support its
conclusion, and (4) constituting an improper delegation of judicial
discretion to the law enforcement agency responsible for maintaining
investigative records.9'
First, the dissent attacked the majority for contravening the PDA's
plain language. The dissent characterized the failure to construe the law
enforcement exemption narrowly as Newman's "primary flaw. 92 It
emphasized that only "specific" intelligence information and "specific"
investigative records are nondisclosable; and then only where it is
"essential to effective law enforcement."93 The dissent stated:
The PDA, in short, dictates that the decision regarding disclosure or
nondisclosure of records or information is to turn on whether
S9. Id.
90. Id. at 576, 947 P.2d at 717 (Alexander, J., dissenting). Joining Justice Alexander were Chief
Justice Durham and Justices Madsen and Sanders. Id. at 584, 947 P.2d at 721.
91. Id. at 575-76, 947 P.2d at 717 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 577, 947 P.2d at 717 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Alexander. J., dissenting) (emphasis added by dissenting opinion).
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nondisclosure is either essential to effective law enforcement or to
protect privacy rights, not on whether the records are contained in
an open file.94
The dissent was also concerned about the reach of the majority's
categorical exemption. Because there is no statute of limitations on
murder, all unsolved murders are "theoretically open investigations," and
an entire class of files is per se exempt from disclosure.95
Second, the dissent found the majority's treatment of PAWS contrary
to stare decisis. 96 The result of the majority's decision that open files are
categorically exempt is that the law enforcement agency-not the
courts-will decide what is exempt and what may be disclosed. Such a
transfer of power is exactly what the PAWS court refused to do: "leaving
the interpretation and enforcement of the PDA's requirements to the very
agencies it was designed to regulate is the 'most direct course to [the
PDA's] devitalization."' 97 Also important to the dissenting opinion was
the PAWS court's refusal to recognize nondisclosure of entire records.
Rather, agencies must parse and withhold only exempt portions.9"
Third, the dissent distinguished the FOIA from the PDA. The dissent
stated that under the FOIA, the exemption turns on the status of the case
whereas under the PDA, the exemption "hinges on the nature of the
record, that is, whether it is essential to effective law enforcement."99
Moreover, the FOIA's standard for exemption is whether the documents
could "reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings," whereas the PDA standard looks to whether nondisclosure
is "essential to effective law enforcement."'00 The FOIA does not contain
a provision explicitly directing courts to construe its exemptions
narrowly.' Thus, the dissent criticized the majority's reliance on federal
94. Id. (Alexander, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 578, 947 P.2d at 718 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 579, 947 P.2d at 718-19 (Alexander, J., dissenting) ("The majority's holding... flies in
the face of... PA WS.").
97. Id. (Alexander, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 131, 580
P.2d 246, 251 (1978)).
98. Id. at 579, 947 P.2d at 719 (Alexander, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.B.
99. Newman, 133 Wash. 2d at 581, 947 P.2d at 719 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Alexander, J., dissenting) (quoting in part 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)).
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authority as inappropriate. Finally, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of Robbins Tire's "generic determination."'' 2
The dissent's final argument lamented the delegation of a judicial
function to law enforcement agencies because it (1) is properly the
responsibility of courts; (2) contravenes the PDA's mandate; and
(3) results in self-policing, which leads to the downfall of the PDA. 0 3 In
closing, the dissent viewed the Newman decision as a blow against the
people's sovereignty "by granting the public agency that has maintained
the Pratt murder file for almost 30 years an absolute veto right over the
disclosure of any of its contents.
'' 04
IV. ANALYSIS
Newman's categorical exemption ignores an extremely important
requirement of the PDA-analysis of whether the nondisclosure of
information is essential to effective law enforcement. Following
Newman, if the police declare a file to be open, a court must
mechanically declare the entire record exempt from disclosure regardless
of its nature. Courts, rather than agencies, are the proper bodies to decide
whether a document is exempt. Newman's rule smacks of judicial
legislation, as it lacks support in the language of the PDA. Newman also
conflicts with prior case law that requires agencies to prove affirmatively
that an exemption applies. Newman's categorical exemption simply does
not make sense as applied to a twenty-five year old file; the majority
offers general rather than fact-specific reasons for the exemption of the
Pratt file. This Note suggests that Washington courts adopt a case-by-
case approach, requiring law enforcement agencies in every case to show
why each narrowly defined category of documents in an open police file
is exempt.
102. Ne iman, 133 Wash. 2d at 581, 947 P.2d at 719 (Alexander, J., dissenting) (referring to
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978)); see supra note 85 and accompanying
text. The Newman dissent read Robbins Tire to mean that although generic determinations of
particular kinds of investigative files could be made, the federal courts must still determine whether a
generic class of records should be disclosed. The inquiry turns on whether disclosure would interfere
with enforcement proceedings. Newman, 133 Wash. 2d at 581, 947 P.2d at 720 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting); see also supra Part II.
103. Newman, 133 Wash. 2d at 582-83, 947 P.2d at 720-21 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 583, 947 P.2d at 721 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
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A. Newman Contravenes the Policy of the PDA
Newman violates the explicit policy of the PDA by keeping the
citizenry uninformed about open police files with potentially great public
interest. The PDA's purpose is to keep citizens informed so they have
confidence in and control over their government.' 5 The people, not
agencies, are to decide what the public should and should not know. 6
More importantly, Newman strips the court of its constitutional duty to
decide disputes by allowing the police effectively to exempt themselves
from the terms of the Act,0 7 despite prior precedent that seriously
questioned the propriety of agency review. 8 In Newman, the court
belittled judicial reliance on a regulation promulgated by the withholding
agency because an "agency is without authority to determine the scope of
exemptions under the act."'0 9 Accordingly, it is difficult to comprehend
why the police in Newman may retain the power of discretionary
disclosure by declaring a file exempt from mandatory disclosure because
it is open."0 The democratic ideal of the PDA is clear, but the
unfortunate result of Newman usurps this ideal by appointing the fox as
the sole guard of the henhouse.
B. The Majority Fails to Articulate Why the Confidentiality of Pratt's
File Is Necessary for Effective Law Enforcement
The Newman court seems intent on fashioning a rule for future cases
instead of one for the facts at hand. The majority's broad statement of the
issue sets it up for a broad holding: "whether information within an open
police investigation can be withheld from disclosure under RCW
42.17.3 10(1)(d) because the nondisclosure of the information is essential
to effective law enforcement."''. A more appropriate statement of the
issue might have been "whether the designation of a police file as open
105. See supra notes 28, 32 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 37, 103 and accompanying text; see also Wash. Const. art. IV, § 1; State ex
rel. Campbell v. Superior Court, 25 Wash. 271, 65 P. 183 (1901) (stating that judicial function is to
declare and construe law).
108. Brouillet v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 114 Wash. 2d 788, 794, 791 P.2d 526, 529 (1990).
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110. See supra text accompanying note 89 ("This exemption allows the law enforcement agency,
not the courts, to determine what information, if any, is essential to solve a case.").
111. Newman v. King County, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 567, 947 P.2d 712, 713 (1997).
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necessarily makes its confidentiality essential for effective law
enforcement, protecting the file from disclosure under the PDA."
The majority provided few concrete reasons why the confidentiality of
the Pratt murder file is essential for effective law enforcement. The
reasons it gave were neither well-explained nor well-defined. -For
example, the majority was persuaded by the agency's argument that it
could not release the file because that would preclude a decision on how
and when to disclose information."' This circular and uncompelling
argument demonstrates the danger of leaving the interpretation of the
PDA to those it regulates." 3
The arguments given for exemption in Newman are general to all open
files instead of specific to the Pratt file. The court's "general" analysis
fails to meet the standard of the PDA in prior Washington cases that
provided for detailed, articulable reasons for exemptions. For example,
because twenty-five years had passed since the crime occurred, a mere
assertion by the agency that enforcement proceedings are "contemplated"
is unpersuasive. 14
A fear of disruption of police investigations colors the majority
opinion. However, adoption of a case-by-case approach could give due
consideration to police affidavits. Such an approach could also consider
the time elapsed since the crime occurred in order to protect information
pertaining to recent crimes. The passing of time should not be the
determining factor, but merely a factor speaking to the credibility of
police statements that the investigation is active. The recent trial of Sam
Bowers, Jr. and the reinvestigation of the Martin Luther King, Jr.
assassination demonstrate that the police investigations of civil rights-era
murder cases can produce results. The PDA should not interfere with
good faith police work, but Newman's protection is excessive. The court
should adopt a less severe test that would achieve a balance between the
need for confidentiality and the right of access to public information.
112. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 109-10 and
accompanying text.
114. Compare Newman, 133 Wash. 2d at 574, 947 P.2d at 716 (generalizing that ongoing
investigation does not give court basis to decide what is important information), with Ashley v.
Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 16 Wash. App. 830, 836, 560 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1977)
(listing reasons why four month old investigative record is exempt from disclosure).
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C. Newman Is Inconsistent with Washington Law
1. Newman Violates the Plain Language of the PDA
The Newman majority ignores the plain language of the PDA law
enforcement provision. A categorical exemption precludes an inquiry
into whether the "nondisclosure is essential to effective law
enforcement." A holding more consistent with the statute is that open
police files can be withheld from disclosure under the law enforcement
exemption only if the agency demonstrates that nondisclosure of the
information is essential to effective law enforcement."1
5
As the dissent observes, the majority also ignores the plain language
of the Act's interpretation instructions."6 Three times the Act orders
exemptions to be narrowly construed;" 7 yet, the majority manages to
read the language of the law enforcement provision to "provide for a
categorical exemption for all records and information in these files.""' 8
The majority claims it cannot follow the Act's rule of narrow
construction because the law enforcement exemption is written so
broadly." 9 However, this claim ignores the limit specified in the statute,
namely the test of whether the information's secrecy is "essential" to law
enforcement.'20
The majority's interpretation of the law enforcement exemption
renders the term "essential" meaningless, thus violating the rule of
statutory construction that courts interpret statutes so as to make no
language superfluous.' The PDA also provides that only "specific"
records and files may be withheld. 2 The word "specific" weighs against
any generic exemption of all records. The word may also contemplate
case-by-case decisions instead of the federal category-by-category
approach.'23 The Newman holding blatantly ignores the legislative
demand for fact-specific analysis by ruling that all open police files are
exempt from disclosure.
115. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.310(1)(d) (1998).
116. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
118. See Newman, 133 Wash. 2d at 575, 947 P.2d at 717.
119. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
121. Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wash. 2d 637, 648, 952 P.2d 601, 606 (1998).
122. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text; infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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2. Newman Is Inconsistent with Washington Case Law
After Newman, law enforcement agencies are neither required to parse
and disclose open files nor to articulate reasons for withholding such a
file. This has no basis in prior PDA case law, namely Progressive Animal
Welfare Society v. University of Washington's (PAWS) parse and
disclose requirement.124 PAWS specifically rejected the notion of records
being withheld in their entirety.
Furthermore, prior PDA case law demanded significant proof from the
agency asserting the exemption. PAWS and Spokane Police Guild v.
Cowles Publishing Co. show how the court narrowly construed PDA
exemptions and rejected plausible agency arguments. 2 Another case,
Cowles Publishing Co. v. State, was properly decided in favor of the
agency only after a compelling argument by the agency. 26 The Newman
majority did not articulate how nondisclosure of the Pratt file would
actually reflect the purpose behind the law enforcement exemption. It
merely stated in a circular manner that enforcement proceedings were
contemplated and that release would impair the ability of law
enforcement to share information.
27
The Supreme Court of Washington recently retreated from the
Newman approach in Limstrom v. Ladenburg, holding that prosecutors'
criminal litigation files are not categorically exempt from disclosure, as
the prosecutor argued. 2 s Instead, the court ordered the prosecutor to
disclose portions of the file that did not fall within the protections of the
work product rule and to identify the documents the prosecutor claimed
were work product and therefore exempt.'29 Limstrom reinforces that
Newman was an erroneously-decided, maverick decision.
In contrast, federal cases cite reasons such as: (1) the need for
confidentiality of witness informants' statements; 30 (2) the instrumen-
tality of documents to proceedings anticipated in the near future;'"
124. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Part I.B.
126. See supra Part II.B. 1.b.
127. Newman v. King County, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 574, 947 P.2d 712, 716 (1997).
128. No. 65351-8, 1998 WiL 675888, at *1 (Wash. Oct. 1, 1998).
129. Id. at *9.
130. Manna v. Department of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1162 (3d Cir. 1995) (involving organized




(3) the tendency of the release to intimidate witnesses to change
testimony; 3 1 (4) the difficulty in verifying and corroborating future
witnesses' statements, especially in homicide cases, after public release
of file;13 and (5) the need for confidentiality of reports on location and
viability of potential evidence. 34 These reasons convincingly show why
secrecy of the information is important.
The Supreme Court of Washington is, of course, free to revise its
interpretation of state law under the constraints of stare decisis. The law
would be clearer and more instructive, however, if a drastic change were
explicitly stated and explained. Although Newman changed the law, it
did so implicitly and did not explain its reasoning.
D. Other Jurisdictions Do Not Automatically Exempt Open
Police Files
1. Federal Law
Even the FOIA, to which the majority turned for guidance, does not
allow blanket exemptions. Compared to Washington law after Newman,
the FOIA places a greater burden on the agency to prove, category-of-
document by category-of-document,'35 that information falls within the
scope of the exemption. The federal statute is worded more broadly than
the PDA, making exemption easier. Nevertheless, federal courts require
the agency to demonstrate that the law enforcement exemption applies.
Overall, federal courts have a better and more considered approach
than the Newman court. The U.S. Supreme Court and Congress have
disapproved of any "wooden and mechanical" approach to the FOIA law
enforcement exemption.3 6 In a 1974 amendment, Congress legislatively
overruled prior cases applying a blanket exemption. 37 One of those cases
involved a request for President Kennedy's assassination file, which was
denied. 3' Modem federal cases look to Exemption 7(A)'s legislative
132. Dickerson v. Department of Justice, 992 F.2d 1426, 1433 (6th Cir. 1993).
133. Id.
134. Bevis v. Department of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (involving 1981 murder
of Americans in El Salvador).
135. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
136. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,224-36 (1978).
137. Id. at 221-22.
138. Weisberg v. Department ofJustice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1196-97(1973).
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history, holding that a record that is investigatory in nature is neither
automatically nor endlessly exempt.'39
From the Court's statement that a "generic determination" of likely
interference could be made, federal appellate courts have adopted the
category-of-document by category-of-document approach. 40 Relevant
categories are important because they allow the reviewing court to
discern how the release of a category of documents will interfere with
law enforcement proceedings.' 4' The majority in Newman misconstrued
the phrase "generic determination" as supporting a rule that all open
police files are exempt.
42
Washington case law under the PDA has cautioned that "despite the
close parallel between the state act and the FOIA, the state act is more
severe than the federal act in many areas."'43 In light of this, the
conservative Newman decision is ironic. The federal act is a weaker
mandate for disclosure than the PDA; yet, federal case law imposes a
greater burden than Newman on the agency claiming the law
enforcement exemption.
2. Other States
The Washington disclosure act is considered a more liberal disclosure
act and its "essential" test is unique among the public disclosure laws of
other states.'" For example, Washington is one of only seven states with
139. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 227-28, 230 (quoting Senator Kennedy's remarks). The Court
further explained recent congressional amendments to Exemption 7(A) as indicating that "with the
passage of time ... when the investigation is all over and the purpose and point of it has expired, it
would no longer be an interference with enforcement proceedings and there ought to be disclosure."
Id. at 232 (quoting Senate proceedings).
140. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
143. Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash. 2d 25, 35, 929 P.2d 389, 394 (1997) (deciding that
with PDA, unlike with FOIA, attorney fees may be awarded to successful party without showing of
agency's bad faith denial); Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. University of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d
243, 266, 884 P.2d 592, 605 (1994) (holding that FOIA's disclosure exemption for grant proposals
applies only to federal agencies and that PDA generally compels state agencies to disclose grant
proposals); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 129, 580 P.2d 246, 250 (1978) (noting that
despite close parallel between state statute and FOIA, Washington law is more severe than federal
Act in certain respects).
144. Commentators have classified Washington as a liberal disclosure state based on the scope of
the definition of agency records; the broader the definition of agency records, the more information
available to a requester. See, e.g., Dr. Michael D. Akers et al., Federal and State Open Records
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mandatory awards for attorney fees for open records act violations.'45 In
contrast, California and Texas have a more conservative approach to the
investigatory record exemption. In those states, open and closed files are
exempt from disclosure.'46 This approach is not applicable to Washington
law, which favors broader disclosure.
Unlike Washington, some states have a law enforcement exemption
that predicates disclosure upon whether the underlying investigation is
"active."' 14 7 Some of these states, however, guard against police abuse of
the investigatory exemption by statutorily defining "active." For
example, Florida requires a "reasonable, good faith anticipation of
securing an arrest or prosecution in the foreseeable future." 4' Defining
"active" in this way avoids giving the agency discretion to declare a
record exempt.
Even Massachusetts, the state with a law enforcement exemption most
similar to Washington's, requires fact-specific analysis. Massachusetts
law exempts investigatory materials if disclosure "would probably so
prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such
disclosure would not be in the public interest."'49 Massachusetts courts
read this language to be applied on a "case-by-case basis," and refused to
imply any blanket exemptions for police records. 5 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts underscored that the police must point
Laws: Their Effects on the Internal Auditors of Colleges and Universities, 3 Marq. Sports L.J. 161,
app. at 184 (1993); Burt A. Braverman & Wesley R. Heppler, A Practical Review of State Open
Records Laws, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 720, 734 (1981); Comment, Public Inspection of State and
Municipal Executive Documents, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1105, 1119 (1977).
145. Sanctions Give Records Laws Teeth, News Media & L., Spring 1992, at 27, 28. A majority
of states award attorney fees upon court discretion. Id. at 28.
146. Williams v. Superior Court, 852 P.2d 377, 393 (Cal. 1993) (mandating perpetual exemption
under investigatory record exemption and refusing to imply FOIA's law enforcement criteria);
Holmes v. Morales, 924 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. 1996) (holding closed files categorically exempt
under criminal investigation/prosecution exemption and refusing to imply FOIA's "interference with
law enforcement" test). The Texas approach is not surprising considering the state's pro-law
enforcement history. See Am~rico Paredes, With His Pistol in His Hand 23-32 (1958) (noting
exploits of Texas Rangers).
147. See. e.g., Fla. Stat Ann. § 119.07(3)(b) (vest 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-72(a)(3)
(1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.878(1)(h) (Banks-Baldwin 1994); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:3A:(1,
3) (,Vest 1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 13.82, subd.5 (West 1997); N.D. Cent. Code § 44-04-18.7 (Supp.
1997).
148. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.011(6)(d)(2) (,Vest 1996); see also N.D. Cent. Code § 44-04-18.7(3).
149. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 4, § 7 cl. Twenty-sixth (f) (Law. Co-op. 1988).
150. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r, 648 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Mass. 1995) (ordering
disclosure of substantial part of internal police investigation).
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to specific reasons in order to carry their statutory burden for
nondisclosure.'
Two state courts have specifically refused to categorically exempt
open police files. In Milwaukee Journal v. Call,'52 the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals considered whether documents in an unsolved murder
investigation were exempt from disclosure. 3 Rather than automatically
holding an unsolved murder file exempt, the court remanded with
instructions for the trial court to balance the public interest in secrecy
against the public interest in openness.15 1 Significantly, Milwaukee
Journal was decided merely two years after the murder occurred. In Cox
Arizona Publications v. Collins, the court would not permit a sweeping
exemption for active ongoing criminal investigations under the Arizona
Public Records Law. 5 The court announced that such a blanket rule
would contravene the "strong policy favoring open disclosure and
access .... The legislature has not carved out such a broad exemption,
nor do we."' 56 These two cases show that open police files need not be
categorically exempt from disclosure; the court, not the agency, should
decide if nondisclosure is appropriate.
E. The Newman Rule Does Not Fit the Facts
A categorical exemption simply does not make sense when the facts in
Newman are considered. The facts of Pratt. 7 and the highly political and
151. See id. at 424 (stating agency has burden of proving "with specificity" record is exempt);
WBZ-TV4 v. District Attorney, 562 N.E.2d 817, 822 (Mass. 1990) (considering and weighing
carefully counsels' arguments and emphasizing that decision for nondisclosure is specific to
circumstances); Bougas v. Chief of Police, 354 N.E.2d 872, 878 (Mass. 1976) (stating police must
come forward with "specific proof" when claiming exemption). Many other states require specificity
as well. See, e.g., Freeman v. Guaranty Broad. Corp., 498 So. 2d 281, 224 (La. App. 1986) (stating
that applicability of exemption for "active intelligence information" is determined on item-by-item
examination subject to judicial review).
152. 450 N.W.2d 515 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
153. Id. at 516.
154. Id. at 518.
155. 852 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Ariz. 1993).
156. Id.
157. Eyewitnesses told police of two youths running from the scene and jumping into a running
car the day of the murder. Pratt, Urban League Director, supra note 2, at A. Within two days, a
S10,000 reward had been offered by Seattle's business community for information leading to the
arrest of the Pratt assassins. Larry McCarten, Rewards Offered in Pratt Slayings, Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Jan. 28, 1969, at A. The King County sheriff had immediately determined that
assassination, not burglary or robbery, was the likely motive of the murder. Id. Four days after the
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tense race situation of the era create a possibility of police cover-up or
other wrongdoing. If this were the case, the police would naturally have
an interest in keeping the file secret, but the public interest in disclosure
and justice should prevail. The importance of public knowledge is not
just persuasive policy, but authoritative law because it is written into
the PDA.
51
It is important that the information seeker in Newman was a
journalist.'59 Newspapers are designed to disseminate information to the
public, especially information that reveals flaws in the workings of
government. 160 Access to public records has been called newspapers'
"most vital raw material source."'' Reporters covering police beats have
used public records to write stories that prompt change,'62 resulting in
better police forces and more efficient and equitable enforcement of the
laws.'63 The Newman decision sent ominous reverberations through the
major media in Washington.'64
Besides the unique circumstances of the Pratt murder, the
Department's handling of the 1994 request supports a finding that an
exemption from the PDA was actually not essential. After denying
Newman's request, the Department, upon reconsideration (and
prompting from the King County executive's office) decided it could
release more information from the file after all. 165 This see-sawing
murder, the local paper ran a front page drawing and description of the getaway car, inviting
informants to go to the police. Have You Seen This Car?, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 30, 1969,
at A.
158. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
159. Newman v. King County, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 568, 947 P.2d 712,713 (1997).
160. In his concurring opinion in New York Times Co. v. United States, Justice Black emphatic-
ally stated that "[t~he press was protected [by the Founding Fathers in the First Amendment] so that
it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. In revealing the workings of
government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders
hoped and trusted they would do." Id. at 769 (Black, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
161. Harold L. Cross, The People's Right to Know 4 (1953).
162. Police Records: A Guide to Effective Access in the 50 States & D.C., News Media & L.,
Summer 1997, at 1, 2 (documenting reform triggering effect of newspaper story on police's
differential treatment of Oakland rape victims versus Berkeley rape victims).
163. Id.
164. Telephone interview with Ken Bunting, Managing Editor, Seattle Post-Intelligencer (June
2, 1998).
165. See supra note 6.
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Freedom of Information Law
suggests that the confidentiality of much of the information in this
particular file was not essential to law enforcement.'66
V. A PROPOSED RULE
Washington courts should approach each PDA request on a case-by-
case basis, following the federal and Massachusetts courts. An
application of the law to the facts in Newman should have resulted in an
affirmation of the trial court's decision to inspect the twenty-six year old
file in camera. A workable rule would require the agency to demonstrate
affirmatively why specific information would actually hinder an active
investigation and why nondisclosure is "essential."
The court should balance several factors to determine whether the
nondisclosure of investigatory files is essential for effective law
enforcement. Whether a file is closed or open is an important factor;
affidavits of law enforcement officers attesting to the ongoing nature of
an investigation should be entitled to some deference. If a file is open, a
court should inquire whether there is a reasonable, good faith
anticipation of securing an arrest in the foreseeable future. The secrecy
often required for open police files should not be discounted. The
passage of time should also be considered in deciding whether
confidentiality is essential. The time factor overlaps with the
determination of whether the police anticipate an arrest in the future.
Other factors include whether confidential investigative techniques and
sources are disclosed, and whether disclosure would stymie police
officers' candidness in recording observations and interim conclusions in
the file.
167
Overriding this multi-factor test should be the requirement that the
agency shoulder the entire burden of proving that nondisclosure is
warranted. To do this, the agency must point to specific reasons why
nondisclosure of the particular record at hand is essential for effective
law enforcement. General claims of broad state interest should not be
persuasive.1 6' Because Washington courts interpreting the PDA have
166. See Spokane Police Guild v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 112 Wash. 2d 30, 37,
769 P.2d 283, 286 (19S9) (holding as unconvincing law enforcement agency's assertion that records
were essential to effective law enforcement just because another law enforcement agency voluntarily
turned over some records).
167. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r, 648 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Mass. 1995).
168. Disfavored general reasons are that disclosure would jeopardize fair trials for defendants,
hamper ongoing investigations, burden agencies unreasonably, inhibit future witnesses from
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looked to federal law for guidance, it is reasonable for Washington to
follow the federal requirement of specificity. Pursuant to the federal
category-of-document by category-of-document approach, a Washington
law enforcement agency should not be able merely to assert that an entire
record is exempt, but should show the court why the documents within
the record are exempt. Furthermore, Washington should approach
disclosure requests on a case-by-case basis. The language of the PDA
contemplates no less.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Newman decision works an injustice to the Public Disclosure
Act's policy of broad disclosure. The Supreme Court of Washington,
confronted with a request for police disclosure of a twenty-five year old
unsolved murder, created a sweeping categorical exemption from
disclosure for all open investigative files. Unlike the federal courts'
approach to similar requests under the FOIA, in Washington under
Newman, a court reviewing an agency's denial of access to information
under the law enforcement exemption to the PDA need only engage in
one inquiry: Is the status of the file, according to the agency, open or
closed? No further analysis is necessary if officers submit affidavits
stating the file is open. This outcome is contrary to the language of the
statute, prior Washington case law, and does not fit the facts of Newman.
In order to balance properly the public's right to know with the interest
in nondisclosure, courts should be allowed to inquire of the agency why
the file's confidentiality is essential to effective law enforcement.
1134
speaking with police, and impair privacy. See Cox Ariz. Publications, Inc. v. Collins, 852 P.2d 1194,
1197 (Ariz. 1993).
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